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Recent experience has shown how diﬃcult it is to implement an appropriate mon-
etary policy under conditions of banking crises. In particular, distress in the
banking sector reduces the ability of the monetary authorities to forecast the de-
mand for credit and liquidity and decisions have to be taken under conditions of
imperfect information1. As a result, the authorities’ ability to manage liquidity
and ensure adequate credit growth could be signiﬁcantly weakened. At the same
time, by disrupting the ﬂow of credit to households and enterprises, a banking
crisis aﬀects investment and consumption negatively, and could lead to increased
levels of bankruptcy, which worsens further the condition of the banks.
In most countries aﬀected by a banking crisis, bank credit to the private sec-
tor declined substantially. Even though the reduction of credit may have been
partially related to the liquidity eﬀects of bank runs that were not oﬀset by mon-
etary policy, in some countries the contraction of credit was much steeper than
the decrease in deposits2. An alternative explanation for the decline of credit is
related to a capital crunch in the banking sector resulting from a tightening of
capital requirements which reduces bank resources available for credit. It is also
possible that sound banks behave more conservatively during a crisis and thus
limit the amount of credit that they are willing to extend, while unsound banks
may be forced to reduce credit owing to the drying up of their funding sources.
In such a context, the scope for monetary policy actions is restricted and their
eﬀects through the interest rate channel are not very clear. The monetary au-
thorities face various problems. First, monetary policy will need to be conducted
in an environment where the main behavioral relations become highly unstable.
The money multiplier becomes highly volatile, usually showing a rapid increase
prior to or at the beginning of the crisis, and a sharp decline some time after3.A n
increase in the multiplier may reﬂect an initial reduction in banks’ excess reserves
as they try to cope with a drying up of liquidity, while its decline usually reﬂects
an ensuing increase in the demand for cash as a result of lack of conﬁdence in the
viability of banks. In addition, income velocity also exhibits substantial volatility,
increasing signiﬁcantly during the crisis period and leading to instability of the
money demand4.
1This is important when a country deﬁnes a monetary aggregate as the intermediate ob-
jective. During the 1990s some countries have been switching to a possible alternative to the
monetary policy strategy, inﬂation targeting. However, inﬂation targeting is not a crucial issue
here because it was only used by a small number of the countries considered at the end of the
sample.
2See García-Herrero (1997).
3Spain, Uruguay and Philippines are good examples of volatility in the money multiplier.
4Although such volatility will lead to long-run instability of money demand, García-Herrero
2Secondly, a banking crisis greatly diminishes the eﬀectiveness of monetary pol-
icy and reduces the ability of the central bank to manage liquidity, since it has to
work in an environment where both sound and unsound banks are present. These
problems are further compounded the greater the reliance on direct monetary
instruments, as they lower the ﬂexibility of the monetary authorities to react to
changes in liquidity conditions. In addition, the eﬀectiveness of indirect monetary
instruments suﬀers from the eﬀects on bank soundness of the increasing deteri-
oration in the quality of bank assets, and of the growing interbank market seg-
mentation; which disrupt the responsiveness of credit aggregates to interest rates.
Bank lending might become less sensitive to interest rates owing to capitalization
of interest payments and massive roll-overs of loans, since borrowers’ demand for
credit becomes less elastic on account of their growing ﬁnancial troubles. Mon-
e t a r yp o l i c y ,h o w e v e r ,m a ya ﬀect not only the general level of interest rates but
also the loan supply through the lending channel. This situation highlights the
independent role of the credit channel of the monetary transmission mechanism.
Speciﬁcally, the impact of monetary policy may be ampliﬁed through the lend-
ing channel more than what could be expected in the case that policy were only
transmitted through the interest rate channel. Since a banking crisis increases
the variability of interest rates, their information content is lost to a large degree
and banks may have to resort to credit rationing practices. The latter lead to
distortions and may accelerate business bankruptcies, especially among small and
medium-sized ﬁrms, therefore leading to a faster decrease of output. Thus the
credit channel might amplify the economic decline5.
Finally, the authorities’ eﬀorts to avoid illiquidity in the system during a bank-
ing crisis are also complicated by the need to preserve price stability. On the one
hand, the relationship between monetary instruments and objectives becomes less
predictable during a banking crisis. On the other hand, while the central bank is
usually primarily responsible for ensuring price stability, it is also responsible for
the stability of the banking system, which may require injecting liquidity into the
banks.
Most of the papers that have been written on the issue of monetary policy
during a banking crisis have focused on case studies but few have based their
conclusion on the use of econometric analysis. The purpose of this paper is to
estimate an econometric model that could help understand the factors leading to
higher probability of a banking crisis and the behavior of credit to the private
sector in a crisis environment, and to derive lessons for the conduct of monetary
(1997) shows that changes in velocity did not disrupt the stability of the money demand for the
seven countries in her sample. However, her results are based on structural tests, and results
could change if a more complete money demand equation were to be modeled.
5See Bernanke and Blinder (1988) model of bank lending channel for details.
3policy in an environment of banking crisis. The empirical study is based on limited
dependent variable and switching models for a panel of developing, developed and
transition economies, for the period 1970-1998. The basic model is divided into
a discrete and a continuous part that will characterize bank credit supply to the
private sector. We propose that the probability of a banking crisis is endogenous,
that is, the fact that a banking crisis occurs or not and its duration vary over
time. In addition, such probability is also likely to be endogenous with respect to
bank credit.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the evolution
of bank credit to the private sector during a banking crisis and presents the
monetary instruments available to manage liquidity during a banking crisis and
their eﬀectiveness. Section III describes the estimation procedure. Section IV
presents the results of the endogenous switching model. Section V concludes.
Variable deﬁnitions and constructions are discussed in the Appendix.
2. Bank Credit Supply to Private Sector Behaviour and
Monetary Policy During a Banking Crisis
The recent banking crises of the 1980s and 1990s have led to a number of stud-
ies investigating the factors that contribute to banking distress and eventually to
systemic risk. The literature is divided into two groups: micro-analyses focusing
on banking data6 and macro-analyses using macroeconomic variables that can
c o n t r i b u t et oab a n k i n gc r i s i s .A m o n gt h o s ei nt h es e c o n dg r o u p ,K a m i n s k ya n d
Reinhart (1999) identify variables that can act as “early warning signals” for crises
and ﬁnd that high interest rates and declines in foreign exchange reserves, output
growth or stock market prices are good predictors of banking crises. Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache (1998) estimate a multivariate logit model according to
which a banking crisis is more likely to happen in a weak macroeconomic envi-
ronment and when real interest rates are high. They ﬁnd strong evidence that
deposit insurance schemes can create moral hazard if not well designed, and that
the larger the share of credit to the private sector, the more vulnerable the bank-
ing sector is to a crisis. In addition, they ﬁnd that the vulnerability of the system
to sudden capital outﬂows also increases the probability of a banking crisis.
Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999) provides an analysis of both macroeconomic and
microeconomic factors associated with ﬁve banking crises: Southwest U.S. (1986-
92), Northeast U.S. (1991-92), California (1992-93), Mexico (1994-95) and Colom-
bia (1982-87) and ﬁnds that low capital equity and reserve coverage of problem
6Such analyses use the CAMEL rating based on a composite number of ﬁve criteria of ro-
bustness (capital, assets, management, earnings and liquidity considerations) (see section on
micro-factors in Gónzalez-Hermosillo (1999)).
4loans is a leading indicator of bank distress and that proxies for credit risk and
moral hazard produce ambiguous results.
A number of studies have previously explored the implications of a banking
crisis. For example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), García-Herrero (1997), and
Lindgreen, García and Saal (1996) provide some stylized facts regarding monetary
variables such as bank credit supply to the private sector. As these authors
s h o w ,i nm o s to ft h ec o u n t r i e sa ﬀected by a banking crisis, bank credit to the
private sector usually continues to grow until the crisis erupts and slows down
and sometimes declines substantially some time after the onset of the crisis.
In the existing literature, most econometric studies have explored bank credit
around the period of the banking crisis as opposed to during the crisis period
itself. In addition, banking crisis events have been introduced as an exogenous
factor when modeling the behavior of the variable under study. For instance,
Laﬀont and García (1977) and Kim (1999) include the loan rate, the diﬀerential
between the loan rate and the yield of corporate bonds, total deposits, an index
of industrial production, and a banking-crisis-speciﬁc dummy, as determinants of
bank credit7.
To ﬁll this gap, the model that we develop in the next section, takes into ac-
count that the occurrence of a banking crisis is not an exogenous event -there are
economic and institutional factors that determine such an event-. In this sense,
we include additional determinants of banking crises, suggested by Third Gen-
eration Models (TGMs) introduced by Chang and Velasco (1998) and Krugman
(1999), which have been unexplored in the existing empirical literature8.T h e n ,
we endogenize them to be able to explain the equation for bank credit to the
private sector both in crisis and non-crisis periods.
During a crisis, the usual relationships between loans, deposits and interest
rates tend to break down, and as a result, increased lending may increase the
risks faced by the banks. Under these circumstances, ineﬃciency may arise if
the loan price does not depend on the amount lent, as ﬁrms would not be taking
into account the marginal cost of their loans. Another relationship that can be
jeopardized is the link between deposits and credit. In a non-crisis period, a
symmetric link between them holds but might break down in a crisis period. In
this context, banks experience diﬃculties in transmitting credible information to
the market and increases in interest rates to compensate lenders for higher risk
can give a signal of an unsound position, eventually leading to a higher contraction
7For Canada and Korea respectively.
8Theories explaining currency crises are divided into three groups: First Generation models
for currency crisis are based on inconsistencies in macroeconomic policy mix as the leading cause
of currency crisis; Second Generation models are based on the idea of self-fulﬁlling expectations,
that is, policy objectives can become inconsistent once a currency comes under pressure; and
Third Generation Models take into account the existence of a commercial banking sector.
5in credit.
In order to face this market failure the authorities will need to take explicit
policy action. The central bank has diﬀerent ways of responding to a banking
crisis and the associated drop in credit: lender of last resort (LOLR) support,
open market operations (OMOs), modiﬁcations in reserve requirements (RRs),
and bailing out banks.
There are two views regarding the role of LOLR support during a banking
crisis. The ﬁrst view maintains that the proper role of the central bank as the
lender of last resort is to lend only to illiquid but solvent ﬁnancial institutions.
This is the so-called Bagehot’s “lender of last resort” rule that proposes an elastic
supply of currency at a ﬁxed ceiling rate. The second view emphasizes the dif-
ﬁculties in making the distinction between insolvent and illiquid banks. On the
one hand, it might happen that some illiquid banks in need of LOLR assistance
actually are insolvent. On the other hand, risk-taking activities could get subsi-
dized, and incentives to build adequate loan-loss provisions, reduced. In addition
to the diﬃculty of distinguishing between illiquid and insolvent banks, moral haz-
ard problems may arise and contagion may spread. Widespread LOLR support
can also contribute to a more severe banking crisis, because it may place an un-
due burden on the supervision authorities, creates doubts about the size of bank
rescue operations, and the policy can be abused for political reasons. Another
negative eﬀect of LOLR operations which the authorities must deal with, such as
excessive risk-taking by the banks, undermines the role of the inter-bank market
in the provision of liquidity.
In contrast to LOLR operations, which are by deﬁnition directed towards spe-
ciﬁc banks, the authorities may opt to conduct system-wide OMOs, that increase
or decrease supply of high-powered money. OMOs help in facing a banking crisis
because they provide liquidity to banks. Goodfriend and King (1988) distin-
guish between central bank monetary policy (OMOs) and banking policy actions
(LOLR support), with monetary policy being the management of high-powered
money and banking policy being regular and emergency lending to private banks
and other ﬁnancial institutions. They point out that monetary policy can be im-
plemented without supporting ﬁnancial regulations, and that it can be managed
instead with OMOs in government bonds. The advantage of monetary policy dur-
ing an episode of banking crisis is that it can provide resources to banks to meet
depositors’ demands at a low resource cost. However, banking policy involves a
swap of government securities for claims on individual banks, and therefore gives
rise to costs in terms of additional required supervision. In addition, sterilized
discount window lending, that is, discount window lending accompanied by an
open-market sale of equal value has no monetary policy implications due to the
fact that it leaves high-powered money unaﬀected. It is a mere substitution of
6bank paper for government paper for the central bank. These operations are
pure banking policy, oﬀering lines of credit to individual banks as a private bank.
Goodfriend and King (1988) conclude that it is monetary policy and not bank-
ing policy that is both necessary and suﬃcient for a central bank to protect the
banking system from a crisis.
Reserve requirements (RRs) are in principle another indirect monetary instru-
ment that can inject or withdraw liquidity on a system-wide basis. Banks have
to buy temporary liquidity from the central bank when RRs are increased, which
leads to a reduction of their lending activity. Conversely, a reduction in RR may
lead to an expansion in lending. Unlike OMOs, RRs are a unilateral decision of
the central bank that has a signiﬁcant big eﬀect on banks’ portfolios and suﬀers
from problems of implementation. In addition, frequent changes in RR will lead
to higher holdings of excess reserves by the banks to be used as a buﬀer and
to the use of substitutes for deposits, thus weakening the link between RRs and
the money multiplier and eventually the monetary target. Therefore, OMOs are
better suited for the eﬃcient execution of monetary policy; RRs can help to de-
termine the amount of OMOs that the central bank would need to provide but
do not help eﬃciently to determine the stock of money.
Finally, another form of reaction from the authorities has been to bail out
insolvent banks with public resources. Even though this could lead to a temporary
increase in liquidity, it could slow down the implementation of risk management
systems due to the fact that banks could expect future bailouts. In addition, the
ﬁscal burden can be very large.
3. An Endogenous Switching Model
This section develops an econometric model that aims to be an alternative to the
previous literature. We investigate formally what are the main factors that could
help assess the likelihood of a banking crisis and those that could help determine
the behavior of bank credit to the private sector during a banking crisis. On the
basis of these ﬁndings, we will then attempt to derive useful conclusions regarding
the role that monetary policy can play in a ﬁnancial crisis.
Consequently, the rationality behind the model below is that a banking crisis
is endogenous with respect to bank credit to the private sector. In addition, the
model also attempts to explain if the probability that a banking crisis occurs,
i.e., if it is binding or not, and its duration vary over time. In order to capture
these interactions, an endogenous switching model will be used, in which the con-
tinous behavior of bank credit to the private sector is described by two regression
equations -one for crisis periods (equation 3.1), and another one for tranquil or
non-crisis periods (equation 3.2). The model also includes a discrete criterion
7function that determines which of these two equations is applicable in any given
situation (equation 3.3).
Therefore, the switching model with endogenous switching is deﬁned as follows:
c1i = X1iβ1 + u1i (3.1)
c2i = X2iβ2 + u2i (3.2)
B
∗
i = Ziγ − εi. (3.3)









where c1i and c2i are bank credit to the private sector in a crisis and non-crisis
period, respectively; X1i and X2i are the explanatory variables of the continu-
ous equations -bank credit equation- and Zi are the explanatory variables of the
discrete equation -banking crisis equation. We assume that the error term εi is
correlated with the error terms u1i and u2i.
The selection variable B∗
i, that measures the intensity of the banking crisis, is
not fully observable; we can only observe a sign for Bi. In other words, it is possible
to determine whether there is a banking crisis or not, but not its magnitude.
T h es a m p l es e l e c t i o nt e l l su st h a tc1i is observed only when B∗
i is greater than
zero -that is, during a crisis - but cannot be observed when B∗
i is equal or lower
than zero.
Bi =1 iff B
∗
i > 0 (3.4)
Bi =0 iff B
∗
i ≤ 0.
The observed ci is deﬁned as
ci = c1i iff Bi =1 (3.5)
ci = c2i iff Bi =0
It is important to point out that estimation of 3.1 using only data during a
banking crisis would produce inconsistent estimates of β because it neglects all
information coming from the endogeneity of a banking crisis.





























where g and f are, respectively, the bivariate normal density functions of
(u1i,εi)a n d( u2i,εi).
In order to avoid the above integrals, Lee (1976) proposes a two-step method.
The ﬁrst step is to model the selection equation, namely, whether there is a
banking crisis or not, as follows:
Bit =» (Zit ´ γ + εit ≥ 0), (3.6)
where the indicator function » (.) is equal to 1 if the statement in the argument
is true, and equal to 0 otherwise.
There are diﬀerent approaches to estimating the binomial model. We will
choose a probit ML estimation which assumes normality in the residuals and can
be expressed as follows:
Pr(Bi =1 )=P r( εii − γ´ Zi)=1− Φ(−γ´ Zi),
where Φ(.) is the cumulative distribution function (standard normal) for εi.
εi is normalized to have var=1. The observed values of Bi are realizations of a
binomial process with the probabilities above and variation from trial to trial.
Then, we need to obtain the expected values of the residuals u1i and u2i as
follows:
E (u1i | εi ≤ γ´ Zi)=σ1ε
φ(γ´ Zi)
Φ(γ´ Zi)
E (u2i | εi ≤ γ´ Zi)=σ2ε
φ(γ´ Zi)
1 − Φ(γ´ Zi)
.
Let’s deﬁne the following Mills ratios,
ˆ W1i = φ(γ´ Zi)/Φ(γ´ Zi) and ˆ W2i = φ(γ´ Zi)/[1 − Φ(γ´ Zi)],
where φ(.) is the standard normal density function and Φ(.) the distribution
function.
We obtain estimates for the Mills ratios by substituting the estimated for ˆ γ
for γ.
The second step consists of rewriting our original model as follows:
9c1i = β
´
1X1i + σ1εW1i + ν1i for Bi =1 (3.7)
c2i = β
´
2X2i + σ2εW2i + ν2i for Bi =0 , (3.8)
where
Eν1i | x1i,z i =0
Eν2i | x2i,z i =0 .
In the second step, we substitute the ˆ W estimated from the ﬁr s ts t e pi nt h e
equations above. This two-step procedure gives consistent estimates of β.
4. Empirical Results
The results are derived from the two components of the model: (a) the discrete
component, which analyzes the factors leading to a banking crisis and (b) the
continuous component, which describes the changes in the behavior of bank credit
to the private sector during a banking crisis.
4.1. Factors Leading to a Banking Crisis
This part of the model explores which macroeconomic and institutional factors are
associated with the appearance of a banking crisis. The purpose is to endogenize
the probability of the appearance of a crisis in our bank credit equations in the
second part of the model.
Based on the econometric model developed in the preceding section, we present
the ﬁrst part of our results, namely the factors that help to explain the likelihood
of banking crises. We can divide such factors between traditional fundamental
variables and variables that can be identiﬁed when applying the new TGMs.
These models allow for the interaction of banking crises and currency crises, the
so-called twin crises. In our speciﬁcation, we include variables coming from the
traditional models such as changes in the terms of trade, exchange rate, ﬁscal
surplus/deﬁcit over GDP and real interest rate; and variables from the TGMs
such as interest controls, currency crisis, stock market prices, private credit over
GDP, the presence of a deposit insurance scheme, and M2 over reserves.
The parameters arising from the estimation of the equation on the probability
of a banking crisis (equation 3.6) are reported in Table 1. Since the estimated
coeﬃcients are not easily interpretable, we also report the eﬀects of an inﬁnitesimal
10change in regressors on the probability of a banking crisis evaluated at the mean
values of the data.
Table 1. Probability of a banking crisis
Variables Estimate T-Statistic δF/δx
Constant -1.90 -3.74
Interest Controls -.36 -2.40 -.115
Currency Crisis .90 3.42 .338
GDP Growth -2.24 -4.67 -.721
Terms of Trade Change 3.74e-03 1.11 .001
Exchange Rate -8.82e-06 -.30 -2.77e-06
Real Interest Rate .01 2.05 .004
Inﬂation -1.42 -2.94 -.457
Lag of Stock Market Prices -.37 -2.00 -.121
Fiscal Surplus/Deﬁcit over GDP -.43 -.38 -.139
Lag of Credit to the private sector over GDP .67 2.36 .218
Deposit Insurance Scheme .36 2.33 .113
M2 over Reserves 1.71e-06 .001 5.51e-07
χ2 87.13
p-value 0.00
No. of Observations 505
From Table 1, we can point out that the variables coming from the TGMs
appear to be more signiﬁcant than the other variables and that the eﬀects of
currency crisis, inﬂation and lag of credit to the private sector are very large. We
discuss this below.
The sign and signiﬁcance of the estimated coeﬃc i e n tf o rt h ev a r i a b l eo ni n -
terest controls (IC) indicates that the removal of interest controls tends to in-
crease the probability of a banking crisis. This result may reﬂect the fact that
many countries have implemented ﬁnancial liberalization without simultaneously
strengthening bank regulation; the resulting bank mismanagement then tends to
lead to a banking crisis.
The variable measuring the lag of credit to the private sector over GDP is
signiﬁcant and exhibits a positive sign. This implies that a lending boom can
lead to a banking crisis, especially if banks do not have good credit and risk
management systems in place. This result coincides with Gourinchas (1999), who
shows with a sample of 91 countries during the period 1960-96 that the probability
of having a banking crisis or a balance of payments crisis signiﬁcantly increases
after a lending boom, which could in turn be related to the eﬀects if lifting of
interest rate controls in a situation of imperfect supervision.
It is also clear that the presence of a currency crisis is an important indicator
11of the likelihood of a banking crisis. In this regard, Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1999) show that although banking and currency crises are not unidirectional, a
banking crisis tends to predate a currency crisis and the subsequent collapse of the
currency tends to deepen the banking crisis, giving rise to a vicious cycle. They
claim that even when there is no apparent causal link between the two crises,
they usually share common causes, such as an economic recession, a worsening
of the terms of trade and an overvalued exchange rate. On the other hand,
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995) point out that countries with a pegged exchange rate
and experiencing a banking crisis are more likely to suﬀer from a speculative
attack against the currency. Depositors can change their domestic deposits to
foreign currency abroad if they expect a devaluation, thus leaving domestic banks
illiquid. The coeﬃcient for a currency crisis shows a strong relation between both
kinds of crises9.
The model also introduces moral hazard issues by considering the existence
of deposit insurance schemes (DIS). There are diﬀerent positions in the literature
on the eﬀects of DIS. On the one hand, for example, Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
point out that the implementation of an implicit or explicit DIS can help avoid
self-fulﬁlling bank runs; as a result, a DIS would help to reduce the probability of a
banking crisis. On the other hand, according to Kareken and Wallace (1978), DIS
do not provide any social improvement and banks will hold as risky portfolios
as regulations allow in a context of moral hazard. Our model results show a
strong positive correlation between the presence of DIS and the probability of a
banking crisis. These results, which are similar to those of Demirgüç-Kunt and
Detragiache (1998), probably reﬂect the fact that a DIS can lead to moral hazard
and encourage an excessive increase in bank credit as banks are willing to take
on additional risk. In addition, underfunded DIS may give rise to a process of
adverse selection, leading to deposit runs. However, variables used in the model
might be contemporary with the introduction of DIS, since DIS are a sometimes
adopted at the time of the crisis. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) show
that the probabilities of adopting DIS and the occurrence of a banking crisis are
driven by diﬀerent factors, and that correcting for the possible endogeneity of DIS
does not change the results of the banking crisis equation.
The model results also show that real GDP growth is negatively related to the
occurrence of a banking crisis, which highlights the importance of the state of the
real economy in determining the health of the banks. As expected, declines in
9In this paper we have introduced currency crisis as an exogenous variable; however, in a
companion paper we endogenize currency crisis, to take fully into account that liquidity support
to fragile banks and defense of a currency peg can become inconsistent policies that lead to a
currency crisis and devaluation, and that defense of a currency could lead to a banking crisis by
hurting the balance sheets of banks.
12stock market indexes also are positively related with banking crises, conﬁrming
that stock market prices are a good early warning indicator of a forthcoming
banking crisis10. The exposure of asset collapse generates a high degree of ﬁnancial
vulnerability that may trigger a pre-emptive attack by panicking creditors11.
High real interest rates in our model seem to point to an increase in the
likelihood of a banking crisis. This may reﬂect either of the two explanations
normally stated in the literature in this regard. Increases in short-term interest
rates could lead to deterioration of the balance sheets of the banks because they
force an increase in deposit rates while the rate of return on assets adjusts more
slowly, which could lead to losses. Alternatively, if high interest rates reﬂect
increasing lending rates, non-performing loans will tend to rise.
A puzzling result of the equation is that lower inﬂation seems to be consistent
with a high probability of a banking crisis. On the one hand, one should expect
that high rates of inﬂation would be associated with high and volatile interest
rates12, which -as the model results show- are clearly associated with a higher
probability of banking crisis. On the other hand, however, our result may be
reﬂecting the fact that a substantial decline in inﬂation as a result of a successful
stabilization program may lead to a deterioration of the balance sheet of the
banks owing to the elimination of the ﬂoat, leading to a banking crisis in the
event that bank soundness is weak. Consequently, even though low inﬂation is
desirable, stabilization programs in countries with weak banking systems could
be associated with the appearance of a banking crisis.
Another peculiar result is that the level of exchange rates and terms of trade
changes are not signiﬁcant. These results are found as well by Demirgüç-Kunt
and Enrica Detragiache (1998). The likely explanation is that we have already
controlled for the occurrence of a currency crisis.
Less capitalized banks are usually more vulnerable to the crisis. Unfortunately,
we could not use the market capitalization variable due to lack of observations.
The M2 to foreign exchange reserves variable is used as a proxy for sudden cap-
ital outﬂows. It allows to test the relationship between these outﬂows and banking
sector problems in countries with ﬁxed exchange rates. Chang and Velasco (1998)
use M2 and short-term debt relative to reserves as measures of vulnerability un-
der the notion of “international illiquidity”. This variable does not play any role
once a currency crisis is controlled for, possibly because both are predictors of a
country’s vulnerability to balance-of-payments crises.
10By including stock market indexes a large number of observations is lost; therefore, we
exclude this variable to estimate the second part of the model (equations 3.7 and 3.8). What
we lose in signiﬁcance, we gain in degrees of freedom for the second stage of the model.
11See Radelet and Sachs (1998).
12See Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997).
13Additional testing has been carried out, excluding insigniﬁcant variables in
order to check for the robustness of the estimation. The results are unchanged
and robust, however, we leave the insigniﬁcant variables for the sake of comparison
with previous literature on the subject13.
4.2. Bank Credit to the Private Sector
The aim of this section is to show how the credit function clearly switches its
behavior from being determined basically by bank business factors during non-
crisis periods to a complete disruption of the stability of its behavioral parameters
during periods of banking crisis.
The literature on credit supply has mainly focused on the portfolio manage-
ment approach theory. Building on Laﬀont and García (1997), we explain the
behavior of bank credit to the private sector during crisis and non-crisis periods
in terms of the following variables: loan interest rate, total deposits, credit the
public sector, central bank credit to the private sector, output, expected inﬂa-
tion, open market operations, reserve requirements, interest rate spread, expected
investment and three time dummy variables (Table 2)14.
13Results are available from the author upon demand.
14Bank credit to private sector, total deposits, credit to the public sector, central bank credit
to the private sector and output are in diﬀerences.
14Table 2. Bank Credit to Private Sector Function
Non-crisis Period Crisis Period
Constant -.37 -.79
(-.10) (-1.47)
Lending Interest Rate .33 .005
(5.51) (0.30)
Total Deposits .50 -.04
(2.11) (-.32)
Credit to the Public Sector -.02 -.0004
(-3.44) (-1.47)




Expected Inﬂation -4.74 -.006
(-2.43) (-.36)
Open Market Operations 1.48 .71
(.59) (2.34)




Expected Investment -.42 .01
(-1.24) (.43)
Time Dummy 1976-81 -1.10 .57
(-.87) (1.42)
Time Dummy 1982-87 -1.85 .61
(-1.57) (1.76)




Note: Numbers in parenthesis are t-ratios
The table clearly shows that during a banking crisis the usual links between
credit and variables that determine lender behavior fall apart. Diﬀerent relation-
ships break down: interest rate signaling on lending, synergy between deposits
and lending, lending to public sector, inﬂation expectations and negative eﬀect of
agency costs. We analyze these relationships below.
The coeﬃcient associated with the lending interest rate variable has the right
positive sign according to the theory as lending rates are a good indicator of the
15proﬁtability of banks’ lending business, in both periods. However, while in the
non-crisis period the coeﬃcient for lending interest rates is highly signiﬁcant, in
a crisis period it loses all its signiﬁcance. This is a very important result because
it implies that interest rates may not play their usual signaling role in the market
during crisis periods15.
The availability of deposits is usually a key determinant of banks’ willingness
to provide credit to the private sector. During a non-crisis period, the coeﬃcient
associated to deposits is positive and signiﬁcant. This result is similar to the syn-
ergy argument in the spirit of Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (1999) where an increase
in the amount of demand deposits leads to an increase in loan commitments. They
show that both activities, lending and deposit-taking, provide bank customers the
same service, that is, provision of liquidity on demand. In addition, both activ-
ities are in need of large amounts of liquid assets on their balance sheets to use
as a buﬀer stock to accommodate liquidity shocks16.T h e y ﬁnd that if deposit
withdrawals and loan commitment takedowns are not perfectly correlated, their
synergy rises due to the fact that both activities share the deadweight costs of
holding the liquid assets.
However, during a banking crisis deposits fail to be an appropriate proxy
of the supply of credit, as shown in Table 2. The coeﬃcient loses signiﬁcance
and moreover changes its sign. An explanation for its limited impact during
crisis periods is that credit and deposit growth slow down and sometimes decline
substantially, although not always in a symmetric fashion. During a crisis, the
behavior of deposit growth will in part depend on the share of foreign banks and
state banks in the banking system and on how dollarized the economy is. Although
ﬂight to quality of deposits to foreign banks may help to moderate the overall
decline in deposits, restrictions against holding dollar-denominated deposits may
actually lead to oﬀ- s h o r ed e p o s i t sa n da ne v e nf a s t e rd e c l i n eo fd e p o s i t sf r o mt h e
system.
A decline in the volume of credit may be the result of either a decrease in
willingness to lend or a weak demand for loans. In order to control for the latter
we include GDP growth as a credit demand factor in the speciﬁcation. It has a
positive sign and most interestingly it maintains its signiﬁcance during a banking
crisis.
Following Pazarbasioglu (1996), we proxy cyclical risk premium by the spread
between the lending rate and the money market rate. The rationale behind this
formulation is that an increase of the spread represents cyclical agency costs that
15Lending rates are not the interest rate used for open market operations, so caution should
be taken in interpreting the model results as reﬂecting ineﬀectiveness of interbank interest rates.
16Under the realistic assumption that raising external ﬁnance can be very costly in the short
term.
16lead to moral hazard and adverse selection behavior in an asymmetric information
context. As expected, this coeﬃcient is negatively signiﬁcant in our speciﬁcation
but it becomes insigniﬁcant during a crisis.
We also consider the inclusion of expected inﬂation and expected investment
to proxy for the state of the overall economic environment. The ﬁrst one has the
predicted negative sign in a non-crisis period, reﬂecting that uncertainty about
the future -more inﬂationary environment- tends to make bankers more cautious
about lending. The relation breaks down during the crisis. Expected investment
is non-signiﬁcant in any speciﬁcation probably because it is not well measured.
We also include bank credit to the public sector in order to analyze possible
crowding out of credit to the private sector. Our results show a strong crowding
out during the non-crisis period and a loss of signiﬁcance in a crisis period. This
can be explained by the fact that during a crisis the authorities’ priorities may
shift, with assistance to banks in distress becoming a more important concern.
As we mentioned before, one shortcoming is that we could not include the
market capitalization variable to represent the collateral available to banks and
the net worth of the corporate sector, because of lack of observations.
4.3. The Eﬃciency of Monetary Instruments During Crisis and Non-
Crisis Periods
The basic model can be expanded by including variables describing monetary
instruments, in order to show the role that diﬀerent monetary instruments can
play during a crisis as the authorities try to limit the ensuing decline in credit to
the private sector. In particular, we consider the role of OMOs, RRs and central
bank credit to banks. The results are reported in Table 2.
We are especially interested in the role of OMOs in the conduct of monetary
policy during a banking crisis. Therefore we include a variable measuring their
presence in both periods. Ideally we would like to use a non-polychotomous vari-
able but there is not a (long enough) series available. Therefore we rather use a
dummy variable, indicating whether OMOs17 are in place as a monetary policy
instrument in each year of the sample. OMOs are a very ﬂexible indirect mone-
tary instrument and their use helps to speed up the impact of monetary policy.
It shortens the implementation lag of monetary policy because the authorities
are able to react faster to liquidity shocks, due to the fact that prices adjust au-
tomatically to clear the securities market. In a non-crisis period, the coeﬃcient
associated to the availability of OMOs is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero prob-
ably because bank credit is mostly driven by banking business variables. However,
during periods of banking crisis the coeﬃcient becomes highly signiﬁcant, showing
17See Appendix for a description of the variable.
17that this ﬂexible instrument of monetary policy seems of signiﬁcant importance
in helping to redress the negative eﬀects of a banking crisis on the availability of
credit to the private sector.
T h ep r e s e n c eo fR R s 18, does not appear to provide to the authorities a useful
instrument that could help prevent a decline of bank credit to the private sector
in crisis or non-crisis periods, probably due to its rigidity as an instrument to
manage liquidity, as discussed before. In general and as explained above, central
banks avoid frequent changes of the RR ratio owing to the large costs that banks
would experience.
LOLR support to banks is captured in the model by using central bank credit
to banks as an independent variable. In a non-crisis situation, the coeﬃcient
for this variable is positive, which implies that the presence of LOLR facilities
actually may help promote the growth of credit to the private sector. However, in
a situation of banking crisis the coeﬃcient turns out to be signiﬁcantly negative,
which implies that during a banking crisis the expansion of central bank credit to
banks is not enough to prevent a decline of bank credit to private sector. Some
other interpretations that can be derived from this result are as follows: First, in a
context of moral hazard and adverse selection, central bank credit to banks cannot
distinguish between illiquid and insolvent banks, therefore central bank credit
cannot prevent a decline of bank credit to private sector. According to Goodhart
and Huang (1999), moral hazard is an insuﬃcient reason to argue against LOLR
policies if contagion is not taken into account. In case of contagion, LOLR becomes
”necessary and justiﬁed”, even though moral hazard exists. Second, this variable
could be capturing large diﬀerences in bank portfolio quality. Third, injection
of liquidity by central banks could be used by banks only to restructure their
portfolios and not to extend new credits.
5. Conclusion
U s i n ga n n u a ld a t af o rap a n e lo fc o u n t r i e st h a th a v es u ﬀered at least one banking
crisis during the period 1970-1998, we estimate a switching model with endogenous
switching in the event of a banking crisis. The model involves discrete choice and
continuous results for the bank credit to private sector function under conditions
of a banking crisis. By accounting for the endogeneity of the probability of a
banking crisis, we show how the link between bank credit to the private sector
and lending rates falls apart during a crisis period. This breakdown occurs as
well in the case of the relationship between deposits and credit. A banking crisis
starts from the illiquidity or insolvency of a large fraction of the banking system
18See the Appendix for a description of the variable.
18leading to a collapse of the credit channel and of the synergy between lending and
deposit-taking advocated in the literature. Other variables used to explain bank
business in the literature lose their role. This is the case of inﬂation expectations,
agency costs and the spread of interest rates. Possible crowding outs of credit to
the private sector are inexisting during a banking crisis since authorities’ priority
is to assist banks in distress.
With respect to monetary policy implications, we discussed the role that mon-
etary policy instruments can play in alleviating the severity of the crisis. We
shed light on the argument of Goodfriend and King (1988) on whether it is better
to lend to the market or to individual banks. Based on the empirical ﬁndings,
our measures of LOLR support and OMOs seem to indicate that the existence of
OMOs may have a positive eﬀect during crisis periods; while LOLR support may
not be enough to alleviate the depth of the banking crisis. More inﬂexible in-
struments like RRs do not play any role during a crisis. Consequently, this paper
gives empirical evidence to the fact that OMOs seem an eﬃcient monetary policy
instrument during a banking crisis, mainly owing to their ﬂexibility in timing and
volume. A logical line to extend the analysis will be to try to answer the question
of what should be the target of monetary policy during a crisis. Our ﬁndings
encourage the use of OMOs as instruments for monetary policy, therefore further
research on the most suitable objective for monetary policy, during a banking
crisis, could be quite valuable in helping us to understand the complete role of
monetary policy in these episodes.
Finally, the discrete choice results show that traditional fundamental factors
cannot explain by themselves a banking crisis; as a result, we need to include
third generation fundamentals of the ﬁnancial sector reﬂecting micro-prudential
factors. In this sense, we ﬁnd that stock market indexes are a good signal to
predict a banking crisis, DIS could lead to moral hazard if schemes are not well
funded, and stabilization programs could aﬀect negatively banking activity if they
produce sharp declines in inﬂation. Lending booms and liberalization without a
strong banking regulation can lead to a banking crisis. Finally, the results give
support to possible twin crises, where currency crises can trigger banking crises
and worsen them.
19A. Description of the Data
The original sample of countries contains 107 economies19 that had at least one
banking crisis during the period 1970-1998. However, reﬂecting lack of data in
some cases, our panel is unbalanced, the period covered for some countries is
shorter than 28 years and some of the countries had to be dropped owing to
missing values in some of the variables. We do not treat the missing values to
avoid misleading results.
All quantitative variables are taken from IFS (International Financial Statis-
tics) and WEO (World Economic Outlook) databases with the exception of the
stock market indices that are taken from Datastream and Bloomberg.
The variable indicating the presence of a banking crisis is taken from Lind-
green, García and Saal (1996) and Caprio and Klingebiel (1996). The currency
crisis variable is taken from Andrew Rose web-site. The Deposit Insurance vari-
ables are constructed based on García (1999).
Open Market Operation and Reserve Requirement and Interest Control vari-
ables are constructed following Gulde and Zhu (1998) methodology:
- OMO will be 0 if central bank or government paper is not used for OMO, 1
if treasury bill or central bank paper is issued with auction and used for mone-
tary operation, 2 if secondary market is well developed and OMO is the primary
instrument in the country.
- RR is 1 if RR is less than 12% when there is no remuneration, or if the
unremunerated part is less than 10% if reserve is partially remunerated, 0 if there
is no reserve requirement or if the reserve ratio is higher -due to the fact that in
the latter case, RR will act as a tax.
- IC is 1 if directed credit is less than 25% and 0 otherwise.
Information on monetary instruments in place are taken from de Melo and
Denizer (1997), Gulde and Zhu (1998), Baliño and Zamalloa (1997) and internal
IMF reports.
19Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African
Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Czech Re-
public, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic,E c u a d o r ,E g y p t ,E lS a l v a d o r ,E q u a t o r i a l
Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ja-
maica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar,
Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singa-
pore, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St.Vincent, Swaziland, Sweden, Tanzania, Thai-
land, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Zambia, Zimbabwe.
20A detailed description of the data is available from the author.
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